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Abstract 
In this paper, I develop a topography of Derrida’s concepts of earth, world, and khôra in order to 
better map out, triangulate, and ultimately understand Derrida’s thought of the earth both as a 
response to Heidegger’s earth and on his own terms. In Heidegger, earth is what presents itself as 
concealed in the disclosure of Being, it is what resists intelligible analysis. Derrida argues that 
there is a more anterior earth than this one that presents itself in the disclosure of Being. 
Derrida’s earth can only be recognized in the trace of passive alterity left behind and re-inherited 
when the world and earth are continuously deferred and re-differentiated from one another. This 
anterior earth is pointed to only in the ways Being is vulnerable to this context of alterity in the 
differentiation into world and earth, shaping this differentiation without becoming present in 
itself. For Derrida, the disclosure of Being can only happen in the repetition of its sense through 
the deferral to and differentiation of its elements. This anterior earth can only be disclosed 
through differentiation, and thus cannot become present in itself, not because any particular part 
of it cannot ever be uncovered, but because the very way it comes to be disclosed as Being is 
through this repetition of differentiation that changes Being even as it is gathered. The “site” 







 Recently, some scholars have been developing approaches to Derrida’s work that refocus 
his philosophy from linguistic application into a broader, ecological perspective.1 This paper 
seeks to add to that approach by better understanding Derrida’s use of the concept of “earth” (la 
terre) within what I call a “topography” of three interrelated concepts across his work: earth, 
world, and khôra. Topography here refers to a constellation between these three concepts as it 
keeps them conceptually distinct even while they interact. Of the three, khôra might be the most 
unfamiliar term. It is a concept Derrida takes up from Plato’s Timaeus meaning “place” in the 
original Greek.2 In our topography, khôra will form the receptacle for the “spacing out” 
(espacement) of the world as it expands through new differentiations in its deferral to all others, 
which as the contextual environment of the world forms the earth. Although attention has already 
been given to Derrida’s use of world, earth, and khôra independently across his works, an 
explication of the three in a topography has not explicitly been made before now.3 This is not too 
surprising as nowhere within Derrida’s discussions of khôra are earth and world directly 
mentioned as concepts which khôra receives. Nonetheless, I will try to show that the relationship 
between earth and world does have many important conceptual similarities to the concepts he 
does mention khôra receives. Through this topography, I will argue that we can better understand 
Derrida’s claim against Heidegger that the earth might not open,4 his long-standing complaint 
that Heidegger’s Being, as world disclosure, stresses gathering and unity over and above 
differentiation,5 and his claim that différance is “older” than Being.6 All of which helps us better 
understand why inscribing earth and world within khôra forms a useful conceptual topography of 
an ecological view of Derrida’s philosophy. 
 In the first section, we will begin by examining Heidegger’s account of the relation 
between earth and world in order to understand Derrida’s response and his own versions of 
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them.7 Then, we will begin to lay the framework for Derrida’s topography by going over his 
interpretation of khôra. Derrida’s taking up of Khôra, I argue following Caputo, is the site which 
processes and receives Derrida’s différance, the necessary repetition of deferral and 
differentiation of the elements in a network for its disclosure.8  
 In the second section, we will move into a close reading of Derrida’s use of the term 
“earth” itself, especially in response to Heidegger, and then situate it within world and khôra to 
deepen our framework for this topography. It will be found that Derrida’s earth is not simply 
what conceals itself as the background to the world as Heidegger has it, but is the trace of an 
inheritance of many degrees of concealment which are open to a differentiation that might 
always leave in reserve some of this concealment, the trace of an earth that can no longer be 
called an unconcealment. Derrida’s anterior earth before Heidegger’s opposition of earth and 
world would name the inherence of the trace of a (non-)substance in-between and before the two 
become differentiated.  
 Finally, in the third section, our topography will be laid out in full after an exploration of 
khôra and earth’s relationship to time. Here, we enter into the thought of the promised earth “to-
come,” as the impossible thought of its future differentiations and linked to taking responsibility 
for the earth before earth/world. Khôra names the place which spaces out and receives the 
continuing deferral and differentiation of all beings as only through différance in a time before 
time. The earth will be found to live on through the passing down of this inheritance from one 
being to another, “as if” they shared a world. The passing down of this anterior earth cannot be 
experienced as such, but only through a vulnerability to différance. This topography will then be 
compared to other interpretations in order to show what makes it unique and useful among them. 
§1 Khôra 
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 In order to contextualize the topography of Derrida’s concepts of earth, world, and khôra, 
we will first need to understand Heidegger’s concepts of world and earth. Heidegger’s world is 
the place of our phenomenological “being-there” (Dasein), the disclosure of gathered 
intelligibility as described in his Being and Time.9 Rather than a choice between idealism, 
materialism, or a dualism of the two, Heidegger begins with our already being within a world of 
beings, without assigning the labels ‘ideal’ or ‘material’ to what appears there.10 Thus, when we 
discuss his use of the term earth, we must be careful not to think of it as the ‘material’ side of a 
standard dichotomy of the substances of ideal and material. Rather, Heidegger’s earth is the 
resting-within-itself of all things in their presentation to us as concealed from intelligibility. As 
Heidegger writes, “[The earth] shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. 
[…] The self-seclusion of earth, however, is not a uniform, inflexible staying under cover, but 
unfolds itself in an inexhaustible variety of simple modes and shapes.”11 The earth is what 
remains undisclosed and unexplained from within the intelligibility of the world, but in an 
inexhaustible variety of sensations, elements, and simple particulars in their own singularities of 
experience that remain inexplicable. Heidegger’s earth, then, refers in particular to this concealed 
background upon which the intelligibility of the world stands out against, even if it can only be 
understood as “self-secluding,” a background that presents itself only as a withdrawal or a kind 
of “jutting out.”12   
 The early Greeks called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things physis. It 
 illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground 
 the earth. What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter 
 deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that 
 whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such.13 
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 For Heidegger, Being holds sway as the strife between world and earth, where the 
structured world within the horizons of our intelligibility opens us to the conditions of its ground 
only through their self-seclusion.14 The work of art gives us an opportunity to experience the 
richness of the earth by bringing out the interplay of foreground and background. It does this 
through materials such as the rich pigment of paint or the strong marble or a statue, highlighting 
the concealment of the inexplicable earthly character of these scenes, which backgrounds the 
intelligible synthesis of the world.15 In “setting up” (Aufstellen) its world, the origin of the work 
of art simultaneously “sets forth” (Herstellen) the earth in recognition of its resistance to full 
explicability in the world, drawing back into itself the richness of experience.16 Heidegger uses 
the example of a pair of peasant shoes in a painting by Van Gogh to illustrate his thought of the 
earth. 
 In the shoe vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its 
 unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintery field. This equipment is 
 pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having 
 once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and the 
 shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it 
 is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging, the 
 equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.17  
 The artwork is not a representation looking to be a copy of some presentation, but rather 
tries to uncover more of the ways in which we could interact with its subject in such a way that 
gives shape in our mind to the objects it presents in their rich and reclusive forms. In the 
painting, we not only or even first see a flat collection of brushstrokes, but open our memory and 
self to the scene depicted through its richness in an opening up of this memory and experience 
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towards further unconcealment of the subject. Through this self-seclusion we are presented an 
earth from within the world that remains outside it, resting-within-itself.  
 But there is a problem with this concept of earth. Where Heidegger has it that human 
beings share a world through language, our shared anticipation of death, and even a shared sense 
of the concealment of the earth, all in all, a shared capacity for world-building (Weltbildung), 
Derrida’s acknowledgement of all this as within an anterior context of differentiation disrupts the 
capacity for the human being to properly build a world “as such.” The continuous need for 
deferral and differentiation leaves the world open to its environment of others in a way that is 
defined by the change in the interaction of the two that defines their ongoing transformation 
together. For Derrida, we can no longer be said to properly share an intelligible world within 
which things self-seclude as its background, but rather, it is in the disruptions of our trying to 
dwell at home in the world that we always might open the world and earth in a new 
differentiation that can no longer be said to be an unconcealment. 
 Heidegger calls the disclosure of Being the world as it appears “as such.” He opposes this 
form of disclosure to the animal’s world, which cannot disclose the world “as such.” For 
Heidegger, the animal is poor in world, the stone is worldless.18 He writes: 
 It is true that the rock on which the lizard lies is not given for the lizard as rock, in such a 
 way that it could inquire into its mineralogical constitution for example. It is true that the 
 sun in which it is basking is not given for the lizard as sun. In such a way that it could ask 
 questions of astrophysics about it and expect to find the answers. But it is not true to say 
 that the lizard merely crops up as present at hand beside the rock, amongst other things 
 such as the sun for example, in the same way as the stone lying nearby is simply present 
Lewitzky 8 
 at hand amongst other things. On the contrary, the lizard has its own relation to the rock, 
 to the sun, and to a host of other things.19  
 Heidegger gives the animals some access to beings such as rocks and the sun in the 
world, but not as rock, not as sun, not as building a world with Being “as such.” 
 The animal’s way of being, which we call ‘life’, is not without access to what is around it 
 and about it, to that amongst which it appears as a living being. It is because of this that 
 the claim arises that the animal has an environmental world of its own within which it 
 moves. Through the course of its life the animal is confined to its environmental world,  
 immured as it were within a fixed sphere that is incapable of further expansion or 
 contraction.20  
 The environmental world of the animal mentioned here is not the same as the earth for 
the human being. Perhaps something of the earth in terms of sensations does present itself to 
animals, but not certainly not the earth “as such,” because the disclosure of Being “as such” 
requires a world in which the earth juts out and is set forth as its background, and the animal is 
not privy to such a world. It is here, then, that Derrida notices a separation between an earth that 
is only encountered in the world “as such,” and another sense of earth, perhaps that of the animal 
(and extending further, to all living things), that involves no world “as such,” but still a shared 
vulnerability to and undergoing of différance as living beings are changed in their environment. 
Of course, this is amplified in many ways for the human being through things like culture and 
language, and yet we do come from this history. Derrida’s alternative to the world “as such,” 
then, is the thought of the inheritance of an environment and inhabitation “as if” humans and 
animals shared a world. The recognition of the trace this environment leaves within the world 
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forges a path towards Derrida’s re-interpretation of earth, a path that we will have to understand 
his concept of différance in order to tread.21 
 In the most general sense, différance refers to meaning coming from the differences 
between elements in a network over an inherent meaning of the elements themselves. One clear 
example of this is the meaning of a word in a dictionary being defined only by other words, 
therefore forming a network of the deferral of meaning which defines words wholly through their 
differences from one another, and not by their pointing to an outside referent. The pointing to an 
outside referent, or even the referent of a resistant self-secluding aspect of experience, cannot 
explain the meaning of a thing outside this self-same identity. If we now think of our world as 
such a network, then its meaning could be understood in the relationships of difference between 
its parts. Taking the example of colour, if two people each refer to a color the other cannot see, 
without referring to other colors, they could not explain this colour as anything but one kind of 
concealment from self-explication. But if we could refer to many other colors, we could begin to 
point towards this color in its differences from others, although perhaps not wholly so. While 
différance was first introduced by Derrida within a networks of signs, our purpose here is to 
bring its logic to bear on his thought of the earth. This is possible because that very same logic of 
the priority of deferral and difference can be applied to a more basic history of differentiation, 
including DNA, evolution, and so forth.22 The trace that is left by this process gives us a hint 
towards an earth that cannot become present in itself, but which can be pointed to as the context 
which the world inherits, and in each repetition of différance, is that passivity which supports the 
transformation of the world. In the deferral of sense through beings in the world, we are always 
opened to the contextual environment of others. No origin that presents itself “as such” can be 
given to this process, except the recognition of the trace left of the function of différance itself. 
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Heidegger’s earth as a concealment of all things in accordance with themselves does not do 
enough to recognize the contingency by which these beings arose, and the relationship our world 
still holds to unexpected contingencies. He misses an even more anterior thought of the earth, the 
earth that does not even appear as a concealment. This earth is inherited with remainder in each 
iteration of différance, impossible to anticipate, a remainder not already inscribed in our current 
differentiations of earth and world, but which continuously ‘reveals’ itself re-iteratively in the 
transformation of différance. Thus, Derrida’s physis remains “the same,” only by its repetition 
that can always change in its inevitable openness to différance. 
 The same, precisely, is différance (with an a) as the displaced and equivocal passage of 
 one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one 
 could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on 
 which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what 
 indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other 
 different and deferred in the economy of the same […] physis, technê, nomos, thesis, 
 society, freedom, history, mind, etc. – as physis different and differed or as physis 
 differing and deferring. Physis in différance.23   
 “Physis in différance” can now be read as Derrida’s response to Heidegger’s earth in the 
dual striving of earth/world. Heidegger’s earth now is a latecomer to the trace of an inheritance 
of an earth anterior to this and always subject to the process of différance, which changes the 
idea of a ‘self-growth’ of physis into a repetition that moves through time with its own disruption 
and growing differentiation. In every deferral of différance, the differentiation of the world must 
be re-knotted in a process that reveals its own scars. As Hobson writes, 
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 [t]he interruption leaves its marks, but otherwise. Knotted threads are formed in it, 
 recapturing the tears but otherwise. They allow the discontinuous to appear in its trace, 
 but since the trace is not to be reassembled into its appearance, it can always resemble the 
 trace which discontinuity leaves within the logical discourse.24  
 The benefit of Derrida’s argument is his ability to make us better aware of the necessity 
of thinking the discontinuous in the world, to open oneself to the earth and the possibility of 
disruption by the environment. Thus, for Derrida, part of what replaces Heidegger’s concealment 
of the earth is différance itself in its expansion, which is khôra in our topography. This happens 
through the spacing out of a  
 common root, which is not the concealment of the origin and which is not common 
 because it does not amount to the same thing except with the unmonotonous insistence of 
 difference, this unnameable movement of difference-itself, that I have strategically 
 nicknamed trace, reserve, or différance […].25 
Différance names the way in which this un-nameable, unexpected, and un-gatherable 
interruption of the world must be always be thought ‘with’ the world, but as a ‘with’ that is the 
very disruption of Being, of the discontinuous in Being. For Derrida, the earth will include the 
trace all others leave behind of their having been formed out of the differentiation and re-knitting 
of the world.   
 With différance explained, we are now prepared for a close reading of khôra as its site. 
We will focus on his essay entitled “Khôra” where he cites Plato’s khôra as naming a “third 
genus, […] between sense and non-sense, inside and outside, activity and passivity.”26 As a third 
place between these binaries, it names the site of their interaction, between each side of the 
binaries and the unpresentable field from which they are differentiated. This same logic of an 
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intermediary place should work between the world and earth as we have been discussing them, 
even though they cannot be said to be a binary opposition in Heidegger, by allowing khôra to 
describe the ongoing function of différance between earth and world. Caputo gives a summary of 
this connection: 
 If différance is what deconstruction is all about, in a nutshell, then “khôra is its surname” 
 (Khôra 95/126). To deploy a famous Platonic image: the story of khôra works like an 
 “allegory” of différance, each addressing a common, kindred non-essence, impropriety, 
 and namelessness.27  
 Derrida himself writes the following on khôra: 
 Rich, numerous, inexhaustible, the interpretations come, in short, to give form to the 
 meaning of khôra. They always consist in giving form to it by determining it, it which, 
 however, can "offer itself" or promise itself only by  removing itself from any 
 determination, from all the marks or impressions to which we say it is exposed: from 
 everything which we would like give to it without hoping to receive anything from it.28  
 In our topography, the distinction of khôra from earth lies in khôra’s ability to receive 
every inscription of form, spacing out the results of ongoing différance. It is nothing but this 
receptivity to this process and its results, not even a ‘receptacle’ if this means a determinate place 
or thing. “[This discourse on the khôra] all seems to happen just as if - and the as if is important 
to us here - the fracture of this abyss were announced in a muted and subterranean way, 
preparing and propagating in advance its simulacra and mises en abyme.”29 Derrida’s khôra as 
the site of différance cannot not be thought as having any essential determinations, but receives 
the new transformations of world and earth. Heidegger argues the animal’s experience is limited 
to its instincts without gathering into a spatio-temporal world. The animal lacks a real sense of 
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anticipation of its future death through the ending of the futures it projects for itself, and a 
recollective (not just habit-building) memory of its past. This “muted and subterranean” 
discourse on the khôra gives us a way to think of the way the anterior earth before earth/world 
can transformatively propagate itself further and further outwards in a series of “mises en 
abyme.” It is here a thought of something shared between humans and other living things, but not 
“as such” – a shared vulnerability to différance that is not the sharing of the presence of a world, 
but a shared opening “as if” we shared a world in sharing the inheritance of his interruptive 
environment.  
 Khôra is “the anachrony of being.”30 It is the (non-)ground of Being in the sense of its 
being the site for the continuous deferral and differentiation of our sense of the world but 
nonetheless forms our shared vulnerability “as if” we shared a world. Without any reality of its 
own, khôra precedes without preceding, in a time without time, in anachrony. Derrida makes this 
point by discussing Plato’s metaphor of the khôra as “a virgin wax”: 
 Now what is represented by a virgin wax, a wax that is always virgin, absolutely  
 preceding any possible impression, always older, because atemporal, than everything that 
 seems to affect it in order to take form in it, in it which receives, nevertheless, and in it 
 which, for the same reason, is always younger, infant even, achronic and anachronistic, 
 so indeterminate that it does not even justify the name and the form of wax?31   
 The status of khôra as virgin wax, a being always older because it is atemporal, refers to 
its form of (non-)existence anterior to the structures of time and space, which are constructed in 
the world. No intelligible structures can be assigned to it in itself, and yet it names an anteriority 
that withholds this reserve, the reserve that opens to the world in its contextual interaction with 
the self-secluding earth. Through khôra, Derrida begins to find a path beyond Heidegger’s earth 
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by going towards the site of différance as an ongoing process whose trace connects us to a 
subterranean mise en abyme of a shared vulnerability to différance.  
§2: Earth 
 With the outline of our topography established, we can now turn to Derrida’s own use of 
earth. We will pass over important references to the earth in The Origin of Geometry: An 
Introduction and Glas which are engagements with Husserl and Hegel respectively, in order to 
focus on his more original interpretation of the earth in his later philosophy, especially those that 
engage with Heidegger. 
 A good place to start can be found in Points... Interviews, 1974-1994. In one interview, 
he discusses the memorization of a poem by heart, expanding this notion to a wider context 
related to the poetic sense of the world in which we find ourselves. The kind of depth that occurs 
in memorization “by heart” is not clearly a gain of greater intelligibility, but neither is it simply 
more richness of the self-secluding aspects of Being. What comes up from the repeating of a 
poem by heart is something not fully understood nor controlled by us and can be expanded to a 
thought of the poetic experience of our surroundings, thinking of it as both the unconcealment of 
intelligibility and that rich resistance that retreats from it in concealment. In the interview, he 
says, “[y]ou have to celebrate, you have to commemorate amnesia, savagery, even the stupidity 
of the “by heart”; the Hedgehog.”32 We must celebrate the hedgehog as a metaphor for that 
richness and mixture at the edge of the world that forms its unrepeatable signature, including the 
deepening of a memorization “by heart” which is at the same time a stupidity and amnesia. It is 
what forms in the poem and the poetic scene its spellbinding intermixture of intelligible form 
with raw earthiness, a richness at the border between world and earth as both and neither at once. 
The stupidity of the “by heart” enrichens the poem not through an account of its every 
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interpretation, nor a thorough research of its every allusion, etymology, and structure. It is a 
deepening of an intimate relationship with it that better opens it to changing interpretations. The 
hedgehog, as an animal that rolls itself up and makes itself vulnerable, becomes a way for 
Derrida to “call the poem from now on a certain passion of the singular mark, the signature that 
repeats its dispersion, each time beyond the logos, a-human, barely domestic, […] close to the 
earth […].”33 The hedgehog is close to the earth as still part of the world. In a poetic viewing of 
the world, the hedgehog is the passion for the singular, marking that trace in the beings that 
surround us of being ‘looked at’ by them from a past anterior to our world, a past that cannot be 
present in our world as what it was, but only in an interpretation. For us, this is an inheritance 
that includes not only the experiences and memory of our upbringing, but our body, our 
evolutionary history, the taking up of a culture and language, perhaps even an ancient connection 
with the formation of the planet earth itself. Derrida says of the hedgehog that it is  
 very low, is something of the earth that does not open, does not open to the “as such,” an 
 earth without truth in the sense of the verticality of the sky and the open. This earth can 
 always not open. This earth is not necessarily inscribed in the opposition earth/world.34  
 This something of earth that does not open refers to that aspect of the world in its context 
of the earth which breaks from expectations in différance, an anteriority to the duality of 
earth/world opposition which cannot be opened in itself “as such,” and yet participates in the 
differentiation of the world and earth. Khôra allows us to think towards the remainder still-to-
come, still to be differentiated in order to come into existence. Instead of an origin, khôra is the 
recognition of a readiness to receive the transformation of the “by heart” of the earth/world as it 
undergoes différance. 
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 In Specters of Marx, Derrida introduces the concept of the “spectral” alongside references 
to the earth, a term which might help us refer in a highly qualified way to Derrida’s earth.35 The 
coming and going of specters will form another way to speak of the inheritance of the earth 
anterior to the opposition of earth/world – a substance which is not material, not ideal, not 
spiritual, but which names the trace of beings as they exist in their always remaining yet-to-be-
determined. An inheritance which comes to ‘haunt’ the world during its every transformation, 
always leaving a remainder of this reserve of itself that is never quite fully taken up in any 
differentiation. 
 What distinguishes the specter or the revenant from the spirit, including the spirit in the 
 sense of the ghost in general, is doubtless a supernatural and paradoxical phenomenality, 
 the furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible, […] This spectral someone other 
 looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before 
 or beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority […] and asymmetry 
 according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion.”36 
 Derrida’s further withdrawal is the more inoperative, further passivity of that anteriority 
and otherness that ‘presents’ itself only after the fact in its trace. This absolutely unmasterable 
disproportion is what is left over after the differentiation into world and earth. Derrida adds 
“[w]e all live in a world, some would say a culture, that still bears at an incalculable depth, the 
mark of this inheritance, whether in a directly visible fashion or not.”37 Through the thought of 
this inheritance of specters, we can come to better grips with the earth before earth/world and 
khôra as its site, as “the radical and necessary heterogeneity of an inheritance, the difference 
without opposition that has to mark it, […]. An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never 
one with itself.”38 Considering this as a response to Heidegger, he writes,  
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 [h]as not Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of what he in 
 effect interprets as the possibility of favor itself, of the accorded favor, namely, of the 
 accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing (Versammlung, Fug), be it in the 
 sameness of differents or of disagreements, and before the synthesis of a sys-tem.39 
 We can extend this accusation to Heidegger’s presumption that the earth, even while 
under concealment, is nonetheless distinct in its opposition to world. Derrida thinks that once 
differentiated, earth and world leave a remainder, something in excess of gathered Being, that 
does not even present itself as earth.  
 In Derrida’s view, “one can never distinguish between the future-to-come and the 
coming-back of a specter.”40 That is, one can never distinguish in the coming of the repetition of 
the world whether it will come back to us as the same world, or whether in its undergoing of 
différance, whether what seems to newly appear is also a coming-back, that the identity of this 
past and others inherently involves a future-to-come as a coming-back, but perhaps differently. A 
little further on, Derrida quotes the ghost of Hamlet’s father saying that he must keep the secret 
of his “Prison-House,” that place where specters haunt.41 In a comparison with the earth before 
earth/world, it too must always keep the secret of how it will come to be re-differentiated into 
earth and world in its every repetition. In keeping this secret,  
 [e]very revenant seems here to come from and return to the earth, to come from it as from 
 a buried clandestinity (humus and mold, tomb and subterranean prison), to return to it as 
 to the lowest, toward the humble, humid, humilated.42 
 Specters express the constant re-negotiation in the movement of différance, coming and 
going from our world back to the earth in their interplay in the differentiation of earth/world, in it 
a sense of both earth and world at once, a spectral earth/world.  
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 It is then the last section of The Gift of Death, named “Tout autre est tout autre” or 
"every other (one) is every (bit) other," that helps us to rethink the death of ourselves and others 
in regards to the earth.43 Here, the difficulty is holding in mind that each encounter with a being 
in the world is also an encounter with the context of the earth, held together in a particular and 
peculiar way. The differentiation of world and earth leaves each other in the world as “every bit 
other,” in the anterior earth before earth/world. This difference between my world and the 
contexts of its others is “every bit other” in the sense of how it could have differentiated itself 
from the earth before earth/world in radically different ways. It is here our death, and the death 
of any other living being, achieves a different kind of status. “The salutation or benediction given 
at the moment of separation, of departure, sometimes forever (this can never in fact be excluded), 
without any return on this earth, at the moment of death;”44 This “sometimes forever” of death 
referring to what is truly lost in the singular differentiation of world, the whole world that 
collapses in their loss.  
 At this point, we have seen how Derrida has responded to Heidegger’s earth in two ways: 
first, towards the non-ground of the khôra, and now towards our inheritance of an earth before 
earth/world that was developed further by the spectral and the every bit other of death. The re-
iterative receptivity of khôra helps us to think the earth before the opposition of earth and world 
as the movement of différance. The spectral earth helps us to think the layers of burial and even 
the real loss that occurs in the death of each living being that can never be recovered. And yet, 
the dead do leave something behind, even with the loss of their world, for others to inherit. “And 
this question would be a question of life or death, the question of life-death, before being a 
question of Being, of essence, or of existence. It would open onto a dimension of irreducible sur-
vival [survivance] and onto Being and onto some opposition between living and dying.”45 The 
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spectral earth is a field of life-death, life and death together, in the sense of our living through a 
necessary inheritance of the dead but through a transfer of their world to ours that may have 
nothing definite in common. An irreducible living-on, after the end of the world as the gathering 
done by a living being, that is an inheritance passed on through their death and taken up by 
others - a quasi-material, a spectral material, that is inherited always with a fundamental 
undecidability between its being a future-to-come or a return. This would be a ‘common’ earth, 
“as if” shared as a world, but shared only through each individual being’s differentiation, 
avoiding a too human-centric sense of Being. We must think of the spectral world of life-death 
as both as the taking up of a ‘material’ context and inheritance, Derrida’s earth, and the attempt 
to refer to and connect together this earth, only possible through the world, after having 
undergone différance.  
 Finally, we arrive at Derrida’s furthest development on the relation between world and 
earth, his 2002-2003 seminar: The Beast & the Sovereign Volume II. Here is his opening 
statement on the earth within the seminar: 
 Men and Beasts have in common the fact of being living beings (whatever the word 
 ‘life’, bios, or zoe, might mean, and supposing one has the right to exclude from it, 
 vegetables, plants, and flowers), and whatever the difficulty we have in the thinking, 
 conceiving life, the limits of life, becoming-alive or dead, we can believe that these living 
 beings have in common the finitude of their life, and therefore, among other features of 
 their finitude, their mortality in the place they inhabit, whether one calls that place world 
 or earth (earth including sea and sky) and these places that they inhabit in common, 
 where they co-habit and inhabiting and co-habitive meaning things that are perhaps still 
 problematic [...].46 
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 One of Derrida’s goal throughout the seminar will be to show how we cannot fully justify 
Heidegger’s separation of animals as being “poor in world” [weltarm] and humans as “world-
building” [weltbildend].47 Not because the animal is also world-building, but rather by lifting up 
the animal’s status as being “poor in world” to being shared by all living things in their 
vulnerability not just to death, but to interruption as within the context of life/death or 
world/earth, the inheritance of the spectral earth before the differentiation into world/earth. When 
Derrida searches for “these places that [living beings] inhabit in common,” he does not argue 
they share a world in Heidegger’s sense, but that they do share this place of inhabitation that is 
indescribable “as such,” but is a place “as if” we shared a world. While humans and animals for 
Derrida do not share the world “as such,” neither do we human beings have such a world. In the 
seminar, Derrida considers three hypotheses for how the world is shared amongst living beings: 
(1) “There is no world, only islands. That is one of the thousand directions in which I would be 
<tempted> to interpret the last line of a short and great poem by Celan: “Die Welt ist fort, ich 
muss dich tragen.” The world is far away, I must carry you.”48 (2) All living beings share a 
world; and (3) Human beings share a world amongst themselves, but not with other living 
beings.49 The third (3) is Heidegger’s view, whose sense of world Derrida tries to respond to. 
The first (1) and second (2) are two views of world that Derrida combines in a kind of 
undecidability in response to Heidegger’s world. In dealing with the shared place living beings 
inhabit, Derrida outlines his concern as follows:  
 Of course, one can always question the supposed unity or identity of the world, not only 
 between animal and human, but already from one living being to another. No one will 
 ever be able to demonstrate, what is called demonstrate in all rigor, that two human 
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 beings, you and I for example, inhabit the same world, that the world is one and the same 
 thing for both of us.50 
 World hypothesis (1), that each world is only an island, refers to the auto-affective 
thought of the repetition of a living being in its own lifeworld. But throughout the seminar, 
Derrida ends up pointing out the ways that even Robinson Crusoe, the most famous example of a 
single human being on an island, has a world open to others and a greater environment, a greater 
context of earth that can always disrupt one’s stability of self as an island. But that does not 
mean we can quickly jump to (2), that there exists a world shared between all living beings. We 
have already been building this thought of a shared world as that which would be that inheritance 
of a context and inhabitation within it which never appears “as such” in each of our island 
worlds, but as a wider context can be inferred by the trace of all those interruptions, unexpected 
differentiations in our world, such that it seems “as if” we shared a world.  
 Before we go further, however, Derrida gives his position on Heidegger’s physis, the 
third (3) world hypothesis above and how it differs from the earth he is developing: 
 Remember that for Heidegger – because we will need to think seriously about this – 
 physis is not yet objective nature but the whole of the originary world in its appearing and 
 in its originary growing. It is toward this originary ‘world,’ this physis older than the 
 objective nature of the natural sciences or of post-cartesian metaphysics that we must turn 
 our thought […].51 
 For Heidegger, we have seen that the earth only presents itself in its strife with the world 
as what retreats from human gathering in a self-secluding myriad of unanalyzable forms, it is 
precisely those forms which resist any scientific ability to claim them. 
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 Precisely what prevails as all-powerful for immediate experience claims the name physis 
 for itself. Yet such is the vault of the heavens, the stars, the ocean, the earth, that which 
 constantly threatens man, yet at the same time protects him too, that which supports, 
 sustains and nourishes him; that which, in thus threatening and sustaining him, prevails 
 of its own accord without the assistance of man.52  
 Derrida counters that our encounter with physis, with the earth, is not ‘only’ something 
that sustains and threatens us, but is an anteriority that requires living worlds to perform its 
differentiation and thereby its ongoing transformation. Heidegger’s earth is both too human, as 
encountered only within the world as its self-secluding elements and does not do enough to 
acknowledge its deep anteriority before human differentiation, represented by khôra. The khôra 
represents Derrida’s attempt to give place to the earth before earth/world in that it is deeply 
inaccessible “as such” in the human world, the place all living beings inhabit in their shared 
vulnerability to death and disruption. The spectral earth before earth/world that we inherit, and 
which forms the context of our world that always might be differentiated differently forms the 
constant acknowledgement of our all-too-human world, with the earth designating precisely that 
aspect of the world’s context and inherence which interrupts it.  
 Near the middle of the seminar, there are many references to Robinson’s terror of the 
earth. “When the earthquake happens Robinson, terrorized by the earth [terre] itself, terrified by 
the earth and by the possible interring of his living life…”53 and “which does not happen without 
the fear of being eaten, swallowed or buried alive by the vengeful anger of the elements, water or 
earth.”54 Tying this to Heidegger’s physis, no matter the technical achievements and sovereign 
control over the island Robinson gains, he is still paranoid about the overwhelming power of the 
earth hanging over him, that force and power larger than himself and which envelops him on his 
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island. Throughout the seminar, Derrida uses his analyses of Heidegger and Robinson open an 
alternative thinking of physis. In Heidegger’s way of thinking about physis, we can only be 
overwhelmed and grounded by a sovereign physis, always larger than us and without need of our 
assistance, to whom we a merely a latecomer even as the Dasein to which it presents itself. The 
alternative of khôra allows an engagement with the earth open to its resistance and passivity that 
emerges in its transforming forms through différance. Naas writes, “[s]ince there is no autos, no 
self, no bios, no life, and no graphy, no writing, before the world, autobiography begins always 
with a detour through the world and through the other, that is, with exappropriation and the 
intimations of death that come through every act of exappropriation.”55 In every movement of 
différance, there is an exappropriation, something given over to the other, to the earth, as what is 
not appropriated by the world – what is called here an intimation of death. This exappropriation 
is what might be said to be the gift given from one world to the earth to be picked up again by 
others, the expansion of the reserve side of the earth and the world of others. With 
exappropriation, we can better understand Derrida’s earth that is shared as ‘the same’ finite 
context, but taken up in different ways. Khôra helps us to think this from the bottom up, from the 
lowest and most humble, differentiating itself in ways that might be different for each living 
being. As Krell writes “…The key for Derrida is to recognize the Earth’s surface as a garden of 
infinite differences, and differentiations, a garden not spoiled by any single sovereign division, 
which always amounts to an us vs. them.”56 In particular, this is precisely not to say that 
différance ‘uncovers’ more and more of a shared earth, but that differentiation is the very method 
by which the earth and the world, grows through time. Growing through in an inclusion of the 
losses from rupture and newness of re-knotting. 
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 By the end of the seminar, Derrida explains how he might reconcile those initial 
hypotheses on earth after a detour through his concerns with Heidegger and Robinson Crusoe. 
The first of these conclusions envisions a withdrawal where all beings are fundamentally islands, 
with no shared world, and would be our inability to share a world “as such.” We have seen how 
the repetition of ourselves in our world is not unlike living on an island. And yet, because of 
différance and the inheritance of the earth within the world we are never alone on this island, we 
always defer to an outside towards which we are deeply passive. But it is partially up to us how 
to react to these ruptures. 
  Or else, 2nd hypothesis, that where there is no world, where the world is not here or  
 there, but fort, infinitely distant over there, that what I must do, with you and carrying 
 you, is make it that there be precisely a world, just a world, if not a just world, or to do 
 things so as to make as if there were just a world, and to make the world come to the 
 world, to make as if – for you, to give it to you, to bear it toward you, destined for you; to 
 address it to you – I made the world come into the world, as though there ought to be a 
 world where precisely there is none, to make the gift or present of this as if come up 
 poetically, […].57 
 To “make as if there were just a world” can now be more fully thought through the 
topography of world, earth, and khôra in their interplay. Our shared habitat of the spectral earth 
can only be constructed sense of world “as if” it were shared.  
§3: Time 
 In this final section, we will finish laying out the full topography of khôra, earth, and 
world. To do so, we will have to better explain the role of time in khôra that explains the 
“spacing out” (espacement) of earth and world.58 In Advances, Derrida examines khôra’s 
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relationship to time through which he connects khôra to “the human earth”.59 Here, khôra is 
ready to receive all others, the to-come of différance that is also, retrospectively, the return of a 
past that was never itself present. This past nonetheless is what ‘returns,’ in what appears in the 
world, but never as exactly what it ‘was,’ as properly speaking it comes into Being first and 
foremost through the process of différance. The site of khôra exists in “a time of inoperativity,”60 
a passivity before even our encounter with sensibility in the world, a time before all 
philosophical, intelligible theories of time.61 All intelligible, philosophical times come after the 
necessity of “an incalculable expenditure, and irreversible loss of energy”62 that traces back to 
“… the nonchronological order, the a-chronical or anachronical dis-order of a time before every 
other time.”63 Derrida interprets Plato’s Demiurge, a kind of artisan-god who sacrifices 
themselves for the world in their working through the khôra.  
 With a draftsman’s or sculptor’s skill, however, [the Demiurge] inscribes, he imprints 
 directly upon the “site.” Directly there on a support that is in no way substantial, in the 
 impassive receptacle called khôra, he engraves, as if by hand, images or copies.64 
 Both an inaccessible earthly humus and the promise to receive its transformation and 
imprint into a world through the process of différance. With humanity entering into the picture, 
we gain a responsibility to continue this openness to différance and to prevent its destruction. 
This incalculable expenditure is called the Demiurge’s promise, in performing its strange task of 
imprinting on the khôra, the living/dying of the earth in both its repetition and its heterological 
aspect in every repetition in différance.  
 Neither living nor dead: ci-devant, surviving, but surviving as dying. Dying [La 
 mourance] and survival [survivance] belong to one another because the being-toward-
 death of the Demiurge, in its temporality of incessant imminence, is inseparable from a 
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 promise. […] The Demiurge would be, from the beginning, a sort of survivor, thus a 
 dying being who writes the world in the instance of his death, his own or the world’s. He 
 haunts a memory, but the memory of a promise.65  
 The promise of the Demiurge is thus the unkeepable promise to responsibly and fully 
take up the earth as inherited by us human beings. Thus, this promise is a repetition, an attempt 
by us at the responsibility when navigating our world to listen for and bear up others as they 
appear in this context, in their spectrally ‘presenting themselves,’ both as fully present to us and 
yet also as still remaining every bit other. The promise of the earth brings the responsibility 
towards this spectral form of otherness that may occur in every repetition of the world from the 
margins of its environment. And, when this does happen, that what is new in the world will be 
recognized as ‘having-always-been-there’ in some way as an inherited part of the earth, although 
not in a previously recognized way. The earth is thereby tied to khôra as the promise of the 
demiurge to continue this task of repetition with opening to différance, the promise of the world 
to-come which would fully embrace this earth, but which is an unkeepable promise, as the world 
must always undergo différance in order to repeat itself, expanding the very thing it meant to 
repeat as exactly the same. 
 [The promise] is not in the world, for the world “is” (promised) within the promise, 
 according to the promise. Not a promise from the human to God or from God to the 
 human, nor of the human (as a being in the world) to itself, but a finite promise of the 
 world, as world: it is up to “us” to make the world survive; […] it is thus up to “us” to 
 make what “we” inadequately call the human earth survive, an earth that “we” know is 
 finite, that it can and must exhaust itself in an end.66   
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 The inheritance of the promise of the earth, the earth before earth/world, continues or 
may not continue, just as evolution or a language used by a community of speakers continues. 
These things continue only in their living-on, which includes the death of their old way of being 
at the same time a new way is being birthed. We are vital part of that continuation as forming 
some sense of world in the world/earth dynamic – for while animals and perhaps other living 
beings might also have their own island worlds, they cannot be held responsible for its 
continuation or destruction, as we can. When any living being dies, its singularity of world 
shared “as such” with no one, not even themselves, ends its unique and signature tapestry, its 
own unique and irreplaceable propagation of différance. And yet something after its death is 
passed on, in countless ways, through the spectral earth before earth/world: an earth to be picked 
up by others in their own undergoing of différance as the context of their worlds, within khôra as 
the receptacle that receives the spacing out of them all. Herein lies the promise of a future 
beyond our death, the survival of this trace of our existence in the world of others and future 
beings. Not as our world, which has properly speaking died, fully ended, been fully and utterly 
extinguished as what it was in its singularity. But in the place of what all beings share “as if” 
they shared a world, a constructed place that survives in the world of others in their own taking 
up of it. Each supposed world as an island now must be understood always within this inherited 
context of others, who in their otherness, might always transform the world and the earth. This 
earth, anterior to Heidegger’s earth/world, must defer through others in an openness to an 
unanticipated, non-teleological alterity. Not a world, not Being, but as a gift that is not the whole 
signature of each being that each living being inherits from one another. The expanse of these 
inheritances, combined with a vulnerability to further change through différance, the spacing out 
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of the earth before earth/world in this field of expanding differences, losses, and gains without 
essential qualities of its own except to receive all this in its site, is khôra.  
 We now have our topography of the world, earth, and khôra laid out in full. For the final 
part of this paper, we will place it within a context of other recent interpretations of Derrida’s 
earth, world, and khôra. First of these interpretations, Wood worries that  
 [Derrida] is perhaps less comfortable thinking the earth as a whole even as a complex 
 system of differences with all the dangers of totalization that that entails. […] I am left 
 then with the question of whether deconstruction is of any direct help in adumbrating a 
 kind of (quasi)transcendental materialism, a materialism that would ground what matters 
 as its condition of possibility, even as it occupies the same one surface on the Mobius 
 strip.67  
 The thought of “the earth as a whole” and a “(quasi)transcendental materialism” reaches 
the heart of a difficulty I have been faced when trying to connect Derrida’s khôra and earth, 
showing how khôra and the earth before earth/world are close to one another yet remain distinct. 
Derrida’s earth can be of help in understanding a (quasi-)transcendental materialism, as that earth 
before earth/world, but a strange one which is always ready to swing open like a trapdoor under 
our feet when we try to totalize any of the ways it presents itself to us. In our every attempt to 
defer through our entire context, we can only become more greatly aware that we share the earth 
with this growing inheritance of others whom we cannot gather, master, or be sovereign over. 
Under this interpretation, the Derridian view of ‘materialism’ is that it remains an unmasterable 
totalization in its further spacing-out in every re-iteration of différance. 
 This interpretation runs close to what Fritsch writes of the context of the earth before 
earth/world, “the claim here is that the context is inexhaustible, not because the list would be too 
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long to itemize, but rather for the more essential reason that the context is itself undergoing 
change as it constitutes the elements of which it is made up.”68 That is to say, the earth forms the 
context of others the world attempts to totalize, but fails, precisely due to this inexhaustibility 
which describes the flow of the world and the earth into the future as continuously open to 
growing more complex and never finishing, although also holding the possibility of complete 
destruction and the end to differentiation, or at least the loss of much of its complex results so far 
(such as all life on earth). Even if we could, for example, totalize every possible variation on 
carbon- and DNA-based life on earth, who is to say that is the only kind of life possible? Or the 
only kind of differentiation? In Taking Turns with the Earth, he argues that the very context of 
our being in the world is being alongside other finite beings in such a way that their otherness 
forms the irreducible heterogeneous aspect of experience. The earth, as the history and habitat of 
life, is one name for the “hetero” “in the auto-hetero-affection that defines life.”69 My 
interpretation pushes further to pull apart the earth as the ever-changing inheritance of this 
history in the spectral earth before earth/world, and khôra as its habitat and site which is ready to 
receive whatever changes occur through the “hetero-” of the auto-hetero-affection. This 
heteronomy in the earth is promised to the world in the repetition every mark of its expansion 
through différance, this interruptive expansion continuously received by the khôra, “only 
receiving instead of everything.”70 The earth and world thereby expand into what the khôra 
receives, with the “promise of the earth” or the earth-to-come being the retrospective truth of the 
earth in the world borne up by this process.  
 The timespace of différance is the reason Derrida speaks of life as sur-vivance—“sur- 
 vival” or “living-on”: life lives only by overcoming death at each turn. Identity must of 
 necessity be repeated, for an identity is never given once and for all.71 
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 Khôra is a cipher for “the timespace of différance” mentioned here, and that which is 
“living-on” of identity within it the transforming spectrality of the earth before earth/world. 
 Touching close to the thoughts of a possible materialism and of the auto-hetero-affection 
above, Lynes writes of  
 an arche-material res(is)tance, older than the distinction between Being and beings […] 
 which would in turn instil the hetero-affection of a material restance at the heart of its 
 auto-affective temporalization, a res(is)tance that resists the ontological ‘is’ at its heart, 
 places Being under erasure, resisting all objectification, all the while making it possible.72 
 This “arche-material res(is)tance” that resists the ‘is’ of Being refers to the rupture within 
Being, an ‘is’ that ‘is’ only as it appears in the ‘looking back’ at how things have transformed in 
the contextual network of différance – it is one way to ‘name’ the resistance in the world, the 
otherness and passivity which is the ‘shared material’ worked on. Later, Lynes references the 
khôra explicitly in the two ways to think about the kind of mastery the arche-material 
res(is)tance has over our world, asking  
 whether it is a hypersovereignty that tends in the direction of a Good beyond Being, a 
 sovereignty so sovereign that it exceeds all the determinations of what is called 
 sovereignty, or a sovereignty that, perhaps like Khora, relinquishes all sovereign power, a 
 retreat or withdrawal from sovereignty that gives place to but does not itself exercise 
 sovereign violence.73 
 That is, he leaves us to wonder whether khôra helps us to think about this res(is)tance as 
a deep retreat from any kind of mastery of the world. And yet, khôra gives us a ‘name’ for how 
we will not be able to totalize the world, for the world’s continuing res(is)tance over time. I find 
myself in general agreement with Fritsch and Lynes, but hope my topography brings further 
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clarity to Derrida’s khôra as the site for the earth before earth/world’s expansion as integrated 
with the fundamental disruption and transformation this topography adds to their analyses.  
 Next, I am more critical of Toadvine’s focus on stone in the earth, as what would be left 
of the world after an apocalypse. Namely, that one of the deepest encounters with the other as 
earth and nature, as the farthest tracing back of to the origin of différance, is the elementality and 
memory of stone. While such a thought of elementality and memory within the world is possible, 
it may obscure or overshadow Derrida’s deepest and most radical anteriority of the earth before 
earth/world as situated within khôra. The focus on stone is one of the most ancient forms of 
memory that can be taken up in the process of différance, the deepest form of passivity we are 
likely to encounter. Stone could form a ‘touchstone’ in being the least affected, the furthest trace 
back of différance, before language and evolution, before the earliest forms of life.  
 This brings us to the relationship between the world, its formation or destruction, and 
 the elements. Just as every stone is outside the relation of life and death, stone remains 
 liminal to the world that it nevertheless makes possible in quasitranscendental fashion. 
 This discloses the world’s ongoing liability to elemental materiality and memory, 
 especially the memory of earth and stone.74  
 What might be said about stone is that it would be the last to go – but go it must, and it 
cannot take the place of khôra, nor can it take the place of the earth before earth/world as it 
transforms. Where I agree more is when Toadvine comes closer in what might be called an 
elemental or indestructible ‘end’ to the trace of différance in terms of a “there is”:  
 [t]he stone extracted from the elements to become part of the world remains 
 nevertheless inhabited or haunted by this anonymous elementality from which the world 
 is extracted and to which it must inevitably return. This is why our imaginations of the 
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 world’s end run up against a limit that is, finally, indestructible: the fact that “there is” 
 something, […].75 
 If the earth plays a role alongside the khôra, as its most pure form of the ‘there is’ of the 
elemental, then Toadvine’s conclusion seems correct. But even here we must also understand 
this limit: that we cannot say anything concrete about what the fundamental ‘there is,’ is.  
 Llewelyn’s thought hedges closest to a direct relationship between khôra and earth, but 
still only loosely connects the two.  
 [Derrida] expects to discover that the economy of the homely internality of the chez soi 
 [at home] of the economy of the oikos is set aquaking by the visitation of some external, 
 diseconomic, unsaving, sublime, unheimlich [uncanny], ungeheuer [unusual, 
 extraordinary, monstrous] unthing of which it can be said in the sinister left-handed script 
 of chora that it exists, but, partitatively, that il y en a: there is some of it about, as one 
 says of influenza, whose name may go some way to explaining why the notion of 
 influence causes Derrida dis-ease.76 
 For Llewelyn, khôra is ‘what is about’ in our not-being-at-home in Being. I have not here 
focused on this “monstrous” and “sinister” side of khôra, although khôra can receive this side of 
things too. While khôra opens us up to new possibilities, some good, like the mutations of 
evolution, they are often bad or unhelpful. Moreover, their continuous persistence comes in the 
form of a rupture or interruption that disturbs any feeling of at-home-ness. This is almost the 
opposite of the safety of stone from the apocalypse. The safety of stone after environmental 
disaster leaves a solidity in what is inherited again by any new forms of life. But khôra, more 
anterior than stone, is without any memory of its own, ready to be inherited. It remains impassive 
and ready to receive, even before the beginning of time, as the site ready to receive all the 
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twisting transformations of the earth before earth/world, with no particular substance, not even 
stone, that could definitely be said to originate this process. Llewelyn’s khôra highlights how the 
function of différance promises an earth that cannot be promised in any of its particulars, only as 
a “there is,” which undergoes différance.  
 It is, finally, Colebrook’s contributions to Eco-Deconstruction that rounds out a way to 
think the earth from our finite perspective. “Literally, the earth remains present; but the 
conditions that allow us to think this presence – conditions of inscription or literal conditions the 
brute materiality through which ideality is made possible – are erased when any factical mind 
ceases to live.” And “The radicalism and force of deconstruction lie in the opening of any 
putative closure: any actuality must – by virtue of the forces that bring it into being – have the 
possibility of being otherwise. No concept can ever be articulated fully; no event can be 
exhausted without promising or being haunted by an unforeseeable futurity.”77 In Colebrook’s 
view, Derrida sees the forces that bring actuality into Being as living minds. But I have argued 
that différance goes back further, existing in processes of evolution and life that might not be 
considered living minds. The anterior earth ‘exists’ only in a highly qualified way – as the 
spectral – but all determinate claims and experience of it come only after the differentiation by a 
living mind into world and earth, and thus nothing direct can be said of it. These material sites of 
its inscription, the earth and stone ‘before’ us, are all only gathered into the presentation of Being 
after differentiation into earth, stone, and so forth, generally recognized as sites of inscription by 
the living.  
 Establishing Derrida’s topography of world, earth, and khôra has let us think an 
alternative to Heidegger’s earth. Unlike Heidegger’s earth as self-seclusion of physis, for 
Derrida, what is supposed to be most familiar as the ‘jutting out’ of the earth in the world can 
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also be source of unexpected interruption. This interruption is followed through in its trace to a 
more anterior and withdrawn sense of the earth than physis, khôra as the site of différance. The 
world leaves its traces on ours, even when we cannot come to understand them “as such.” We 
always come towards the earth through our constructions in the “setting up” of a world. It is 
through this island world of ours, its being interrupted and differentiated, that we tap into all 
these others, each with their own finitude, not even themselves being a total and complete world. 
We cannot think the entire history of the traces of things, but we can ‘name’ its site and process, 
and what this names would contain both the thought of the earth and khôra. We are thus left in 
the undecidability between our individual worlds, a world shared with other human beings, and a 
world shared with all others (a presumed habitat for all living things in their birth and death, a 
world, earth or general place that came before us all and supported all our coming into being). 
The earth in any of its interpretations remains for him the other side of the world, which always 
continues to disrupt the human claim to sovereignty. What is concealed within it is the context of 
others which constantly opens the world to change, to its own differentiation and transformation, 
and this process requires an aspect of within the world that is always held back while not being 
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